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Summary 
The Danger of Innocence 
Common Sense Beliefs and Misconceptions about False 
Confessions 
The main aim of this dissertation is to examine common sense beliefs and misconceptions about false 
confessions. In the last decade, overturned wrongful conviction cases around the world have shown that 
false confessions are not a rare phenomenon (e.g., Huff & Killias, 2008). Various research and case studies 
have investigated risk factors and provided recommendations on how to avoid false confessions (e.g., 
Drizin & Leo, 2004; Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004; Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Kassin et al., 2010; Russanon, 
Meissner, Narchet & Kassin, 2005). Admitting to a crime one has not committed is seen as counter-
intuitive by many people (Leo & Liu, 2009) and most people believe that it could not happen to them 
(Henkel, Coffman, & Dailey, 2008). Overall, studies have shown that the average person is not well 
informed about the possibility (and risk) of a false confession. The present dissertation attempts to 
further investigate what the average person knows about false confessions and whether misbeliefs and 
misconceptions pose a risk factor for innocent suspects. The research goals are threefold: to address 
common sense beliefs and police practices about confession-related legal issues; to examine how 
misbeliefs about false confessions pose a risk for innocent suspects; and to investigate the relationship 
between people’s beliefs and their behavior during police custody. Additionally, a new direction for future 
research is presented by linking the phenomenon of choice blindness to false confessions. 
 Chapter 1 presents the case of Ulvi Kulac, who got convicted based on a false confession for the 
murder of a little girl and acquitted for this crime 13 years later. It illustrates the danger of coercive police 
interrogation techniques, especially for vulnerable suspects. In Chapter 2, two more case vignettes of false 
confessions are described. These cases are followed by a review of the current state of literature in the 
field of false confession research offering an overview of research findings, risk factors, and 
recommendations on how false confessions can be avoided. It also addresses the difficulty of applying 
research findings to practice. 
 The literature review on false confession research showed that not much research has been done on 
examining laypeople’s beliefs about confession issues and whether those beliefs are universal or specific 
to culture. Therefore, the survey in Chapter 3 used an online questionnaire to collect data across seven 
different countries about laypeople’s beliefs about deception detection capabilities, the use of the right to 
remain silent, and the likelihood of true and false confessions. The findings of this survey show that 
participants overall overestimated their own deception detection skills and rated those of trained police 
investigators even higher, displaying a common misconception that training improves deception 
detection. Furthermore, participants underrated their waiver rates to remain silent and overrated their 
own confession rates. Overall, these results revealed that participants universally exhibited a relative lack 
of knowledge about confessions and the factors that put innocent people at risk. 
 In an effort to shed light on how investigators in Europe approach the processes of interviewing and 
interrogation, Chapter 4 presents the results of a survey covering various police practices and beliefs of 
police. By replicating the self-report survey of North American police practices (Kassin et al., 2007), an 
adapted version of their questionnaire was used. This survey covered European investigators’ beliefs and 
practices about deception detection accuracy, Miranda waiver rates, the interrogation process, rates of 
true and false confessions, and their practices of recording interrogations and confessions. Results 
displayed several similarities with the original study and consistencies with research findings, while some 
results deviated from the findings of the original study that was conducted by Kassin and colleagues 
(2007) in North America. 
 As stated above, the study described in Chapter 3 has shown that laypeople’s beliefs about various 
confessions issues are incorrect, including the right to remain silent. In the multinational survey, 
participants indicated lower waiver rates than actual waiver rates of innocent suspects’ right to remain 
silent and reported waiver rates of innocent suspects by police. To examine whether laypeople can use 
their common sense to predict the extent to which people would waive their rights to silence and that 
innocent suspects are particular likely to do so, Chapter 5 described two experiments that were 
conducted. In the first experiment, a mock theft paradigm was used, which had been developed by Kassin 
and Norwick (2004), to test how many innocent participants would give up their right to remain silent 
compared to guilty participants after being accused of a theft by a disguised police detective. The second 
experiment employed a thought experiment in which participants had to predict their waiver rates and 
those of innocent and guilty participants in the mock theft paradigm described in the first experiment. 
Results displayed a discrepancy between actual waiver rates obtained in experiment 1 compared to the 
predicted waiver rates in experiment 2. These findings indicate that people are not aware of the innocence 
effect of waiver rates as a matter of common sense. 
 To further investigate the discrepancies found in Chapter 5, the study presented in Chapter 6 
examined whether participants are able to correctly predict their behavior and that of others in a typical 
false confession paradigm. A self-report study based on the results of the classic ALT key paradigm by 
Kassin and Kiechel (1996) was used. Participants were asked to read a description of this paradigm and 
had to predict confession rates for themselves and others. In line with our hypothesis, participants overall 
were poor at predicting confession rates. Furthermore, our findings confirmed that the average person 
clearly neglects the powerful effect false evidence can have and hence the power of such an influence is 
not a matter of common sense. The results of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 demonstrate that false confession 
issues are not a matter of common sense knowledge and that judges and juries can benefit greatly from 
expert testimony on false confessions in court. 
 Chapter 7 explored a future avenue for research by linking the phenomenon of choice blindness to the 
risk of the occurrence of false confessions. Across two experiments we examined choice blindness in 
participants’ accounts of their own history of norm-violating behaviors. Participants were asked to 
indicate how often they had committed specific norm-violating behaviors in the past. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, a substantial amount of participants was blind for manipulated answers of their own reports. 
The current results display implications for false confessions elicited in interrogation and further 
strengthen several recommendations that have already been given to avoid false confessions. 
 Finally, the last chapter includes a general discussion integrating all findings of this dissertation. It 
starts with analyzing the case of Ulvi Kulac based on all the information provided in previous chapters. 
Furthermore, we conclude that false confessions are a threat to innocent suspects and that certain 
changes in the process of police custody can make interrogations a safer place for innocent suspects. This 
dissertation shows that common sense knowledge about confession related issues is not so common and 
therefore we argue that expert witnesses should be allowed to testify in court to aid judges and juries. 
Chapter 8 also discusses methodological shortcomings and future directions. 
 
 
